Date: 12 June 2026 Location: Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences (INN), Campus Lillehammer
Please note that this lecture is not hosted by the Forum for Consciousness Research in Oslo, but by the Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences. The event takes place at Campus Lillehammer and is organised by the Inland School of Business and Social Sciences.
Venue: Auditorium L200, Domus Medica, Gaustadalleen 34
In relation to our colleague Andre S. Nilsen’s PhD defense, we are organizing an open symposium with Prof. Lorina Naci, Phd, and Michael Schartner, PhD. Michael will talk about how we can use complexity measures to quantify conscious states, while Lorina will tell us about her investigations about what we can say regarding consciousness in infants.
In addition to the talks and discussion with these experts in the field, we also wish to invite you all to contribute your own thoughts on consciousness in a small poster session. If you are interested in contributing, please sign up here: https://nettskjema.no/a/597758
Provided we get enough contributions, we will select up to ten posters to be presented during the final session.
Program:
9:00- 9:30 — Meet and greet
9:30-10:00 — Talk by Michael Schartner, “Quantifying Conscious States with Neural Signal Complexity”
10:00-10:30 — Talk by prof. Lorina Naci, “Consciousness in the cradle: on the emergence of infant experience” (tentative title)
10:30-11:00 — Q&A with the speakers, chaired by Andre S Nilsen
11:00-12:00 — Poster session and mingling (all are welcome to contribute!)
Contributors:
Lorina Naci, PhD, is a Professor of Psychology at Trinity College Dublin, where she leads research on how the brain supports human cognition and consciousness, and how these processes are disrupted by injury or disease. Her work combines brain imaging, psychological theory, and studies of patients to develop practical tools that can improve diagnosis and care, while also addressing the ethical implications of these advances. She also investigates early brain changes linked to Alzheimer’s disease, aiming to enable earlier detection and better understanding of this growing global health challenge. This research is carried out in collaboration with international partners through the PREVENT consortium and the Global Brain Health Institute. She will give a talk tentatively titled “Consciousness in the cradle: on the emergence of infant experience” (abstract TBA).
Michael Schartner, Phd, is a senior data scientist at the International Brain Laboratory, where he applies machine learning and large-scale data analysis to uncover the neural basis of decision making in animals. Trained originally in mathematics and physics at Maynooth University and École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, he went on to complete a PhD in consciousness science at the University of Sussex, focusing on how the complexity of brain activity relates to conscious states. His early work helped advance quantitative approaches to consciousness, using complexity and information-theoretic measures to study awareness in healthy brains and altered states. Today, he develops deep-learning methods for tracking behavior in mice and linking it to neural recordings, contributing to reproducible, large-scale neuroscience while continuing to pursue fundamental questions about how mind arises from matter.
Michael will give a talk titled “Quantifying Conscious States with Neural Signal Complexity”, for which he has provided the following abstract: “Understanding how global states of consciousness relate to neural dynamics remains a central problem in neuroscience. Building on early theoretical work by Edelman and Tononi on neural complexity, this talk provides a concise overview of how complexity-based measures have evolved into empirically grounded and clinically applicable indices of brain state. I will review evidence linking both spontaneous and perturbational measures of neural signal diversity—such as entropy-based metrics, Lempel–Ziv complexity, and the Perturbational Complexity Index—to levels of consciousness across physiological and pharmacological conditions. Particular focus will be given to comparative findings across wakefulness, different stages of sleep, general anesthesia, and psychedelic states. Together, these results support the view that global states of consciousness are reliably associated with systematic changes in large-scale neural signal complexity, offering a quantitative bridge between theoretical models and practical assessment of conscious level.”
A live online lecture by Ned Block, New York University
Wednesday, November 5th, 19.00 – 20.45, Oslo time (13:00 – 14:45 EST) on Zoom
Video recording:
Abstract by NB: Computational functionalism claims that executing certain computations is sufficient for consciousness, regardless of the physical mechanisms implementing those computations. This view does not take sufficiently seriously the possibility that sub-computational biological mechanisms which realize computational processes are necessary for consciousness. Using the contrast between computational roles and their sub-computational biological realizers, I show that our criteria for consciousness in AI and animals may lead to opposing conclusions and in that sense AI and animals are competitors. Current theories of consciousness are “meat-neutral,” but if meat is necessary, AI may never be conscious. Understanding whether consciousness depends on computational roles, biological realizers, or both is crucial for assessing the prospects of conscious AI and in simple animals.
Ned Block in an eminent philosopher of mind, who has made important contributions to the philosophy of consciousness and cognitive science. He has been professor of philosophy and psychology at New York University since 1996, and a Silver Professor since 2005. Block has mounted the overflow argument, which argues that phenomenal consciousness overflows conscious access, implying that one can consciously experience something that one lacks conscious access to. Block is also noted for presenting the Blockhead argument against the Turing test as a test of intelligence, and is also known for his criticism of functionalism, arguing that a system with the same functional states as a human is not necessarily conscious.
A live online lecture by Susan Carey, Harvard University
Wednesday, October 29th, 7 PM Oslo time (CET), 1 PM EST, 19.00 – 20.45 on Zoom
Video Recording:
Abstract:
Cognitive science was born in the 1950s with the adoption of the computational/representational theory of mind. The cognitive revolution enabled empirical progress on foundational issues that had been debated since the time of the Greek philosophers, including new formulations of the rationalist/empiricist debate and new principled distinctions among representational systems. I sketch the current state of the art, as I see it, concerning distinctions in representational formats between fully implicit vehicles of content and explicit representational vehicles and also between iconic representations and symbolic representations. I sketch evidence for the proposal that prelinguistic representations, including those in perception those in core knowledge (rich abstract systems of representation attested in infancy and in non-human animals of many species), are fundamentally different in both format and content from linguistic representations. I sketch evidence for a speculation both ancient and modern in philosophy (e.g. Descartes, Davidson), as well as more recent within cognitive science: namely, prelinguistic representations do not support propositional reasoning. If concepts are atoms of propositions, there are no innate concepts. Innate support for logical thought is part of the human adaptation for language and emerges in ontogenesis in the course of acquiring language.
Susan Carey in an eminent cognitive psychologist and professor at Harvard University. She studies language acquisition, children’s development of concepts, conceptual changes over time, and the importance of executive functions. Carey received a PhD from the Harvard Psychology Department in 1972, taught at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the Brain and Cognitive Science Department from 1972 to 1996, at New York University (NYU) in the Psychology Department from 1996-2001, and at Harvard in the Psychology Department from 2001-2023. She retired from teaching in 2003 and is now a Research Professor at Harvard and a Visiting Scholar at NYU in Psychology and Visiting Scholar at the City University of New York (CUNY) Graduate Center in Cognitive Science.
Event Venue: Sophus Lies auditorium, Moltke Moes vei 35, Blindern Campus, University of Oslo
On June 17th, Professor MATTHEW LARKUM, Humboldt University of Berlin, gave a lecture in our Forum for Consciousness Research, Oslo.
A recording of the lecture can be seen here:
[In addition: A symposium on Consciousness Research withMatthew Larkum and Björn Merker from the same day can be found here.]
Deep control – Layer 6b as a gatekeeper of conscious processing
Matthew Larkum,Professor, Humboldt University of Berlin.
Time:Tuesday, June 17th, 2025, 18.30-20.00
Venue: Sophus Lies auditorium,Blindern Campus(Moltke Moes vei), University of Oslo
After the lecture, 18.30 – 19.30, there will be time for questions and discussion.
Please register if you wish to attend. The event will also be live-streamed (see below).
ABSTRACT by ML: We have recently shown that Layer 6b (L6b), the deepest and most understudied layer of the neocortex, plays a pivotal role in regulating thalamocortical loops critical for conscious processing. Positioned at the convergence of intracortical feedback and neuromodulatory input, L6b acts as a key node in the arousal system, integrating volitional signals with brain-state dependent modulation. By exerting fast and targeted control over corticothalamic circuits, it enables both sustained and flexible attention. These properties align closely with the predictions of Dendritic Integration Theory, which posits that conscious experience arises from the selective coupling of cortical pyramidal neurons and their role in the corticothalamic loops. We argue that L6b is uniquely positioned to initiate and maintain this coupling, effectively acting as a gatekeeper for conscious access.
Matthew Larkum is an eminent neuroscientist studying the computational properties of neurons and their impact on higher brain functions such asattention and consciousness. Larkum’s findings has led him to propose that the computational properties of single neurons are far more complex than commonly assumed. His discoveries of single neuron’s computational complexity has far-reaching implications for our understanding of the brain, including perception, attention, learning, and consciousness, leading to the Dendritic Integration Theory of Consciousness (DIT) and multiple publications in Science, Nature, Cell, Neuron, TINS, and TICS.
Suzuki M, Larkum ME (2020) General Anesthesia Decouples Cortical Pyramidal Neurons. Cell 180, 666-676.
Doron G, … Larkum ME (2020) Perirhinal input to neocortical layer 1 controls learning. Science, 370, 1435-1444.
Larkum, M. (2013) A cellular mechanism for cortical associations: an organizing principle for the cerebral cortex. Trends in Neurosciences 36: 141-151
REGISTRATION:
If you wish to attend Larkum’s lecture, please register within June 11th by sending an e-mail with “LARKUM June 17” in the subject field to: j.f.storm@medisin.uio.no
(We need to know how many will attend)
LIVESTREAM:
This event will be streamed. You can follow the lecture at this page from 18:30, June 17th.
Event Venue: Sophus Lies Auditorium, Blindern Campus, University of Oslo
Prof. Mark Solms, PhD,University of Cape Town
will give a lecture in our forum:
The cortical fallacy and the hard problem of consciousness
Time: September 25, 2024 16.30-18.30
Venue: Sophus Lies Auditorium, Blindern Campus, University of Oslo
Professor Mark Solms is Director of Neuropsychology at the Neuroscience Institute of the University of Cape Town. He is also Honorary Lecturer in Neurosurgery at the St Bartholomew’s & Royal London Hospital School of Medicine and an Honorary Fellow of the American College of Psychiatrists. He is a member of the British Psychoanalytical Society and the American and South African Psychoanalytic Associations. He has published 350 scientific papers, and eight books, the latest being The Hidden Spring (Norton, 2021).
Event Venue: Sophus Lies Auditorium, Blindern Campus, University of Oslo
On 26th of September 2024, Prof. Björn Merker will hold a public lecture in our forum:
Cracks in the cortical consensus: Recent empirical findings that bear on consciousness theory
Time: September 26, 2024 16.30-18.30
Venue: Sophus Lies Auditorium, Blindern Campus, University of Oslo
An overwhelming consensus regarding the locus of consciousness assigns it to cortical mechanisms. Besides the intuitive appeal of assigning what is presumed to be a sophisticated function to an organ that is exceptionally developed in ourselves, a number of empirical findings have been taken to support this identification. One is the claim that severing the commissures that connect the two sides of the cerebral cortex leaves the patient with two separate and independent consciousnesses. Another is the claim that loss of the primary visual cortex leaves the patient able to respond to stimuli in the affected part of the visual field but bereft of all phenomenal visual experience in the same (so called blind sight). A third is empirical evidence that activation of two parts of cortical circuitry, the so called feed-forward and feed-back components of cortical counter-current organization, must converge and interact for a given stimulus event to be consciously perceived. There are, however, rather recently accrued empirical findings on each of these issues that compromise their support for a cortical locus of consciousness. I will review these challenges to the cortical consensus, and relate them to more general characteristics of cortical organization that militate against its filling the role of “organ of consciousness”.
Björn Merker is a neuroscientist in retirement. He has longstanding interests in systems neuroscience, evolutionary biology, and brain mechanisms of consciousness. He obtained his doctorate from the Department of Psychology and Brain Science at M.I.T. in 1980 for work on the mammalian superior colliculus. Since then he has worked on oculomotor physiology in cats, on the primary visual cortex in macaques, on song development and mirror self-recognition in gibbons, and on the evolutionary and developmental background to human music and language. In retirement he has continued theoretical work related to both the latter topics as well as consciousness.
